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The achievement of  female 
suffrage in Europe: on women’s 
citizenship
Ruth Rubio-Marín*
This article lays out the theoretical framing underlying the gendered construction of  citi-
zenship in Western political thought during the transition to modernity; describes the rel-
evant actors in the fight for female suffrage and the impact that the separate spheres of  
ideology had on both the narratives supporting and resisting female suffrage, and on the 
selective and piecemeal way in which suffrage was eventually won by women in European 
countries. Furthermore, it identifies the main factors accounting for women’s earlier or 
later achievement of  suffrage in different European nations and, exploring the connection 
between women’s access to voting rights and to civil and social rights, it retells a story of  
women’s citizenship which is an inverted image of  that developed by T.H. Marshall on the 
basis of  the male paradigm. It finally brings us to the present to discuss the persistent political 
under-representation of  women in Europe, as well as a growing awareness about the need to 
ensure women’s full citizenship through measures that seek the incorporation of  women in 
male spheres of  power and the disestablishment of  the sexual contract, something which the 
historical conquest of  suffrage could not achieve by itself.
1. Introduction
Some fifteen years ago, political theorist Carole Pateman deplored the fact that we 
still knew remarkably little about how women had won the vote in different parts of  
the world.1 This gap in knowledge regarding women’s constitutional history included 
Europe, where, with the exception of  just a handful of  countries, such as France or the 
UK, little comparative research had been done on this question with obvious implica-
tions for women’s status as citizens in constitutional democracies. This article sum-
marizes the lessons from a recent book describing how women accessed suffrage and 
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1 Carole Pateman, Three Questions about Womanhood Suffrage, in Suffrage and Beyond: InternatIonal femInISt 
PerSPectIveS 331 (Caroline Daley & Melanie Nolan eds., 1994).
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came to inhabit the notion of  citizenship in different European countries.2 A compara-
tive look at the history of  women’s right to vote across Europe helps us to understand 
what was at stake for women in the transition to modernity, and how modernity con-
ceptualized women’s citizenship. It helps to give us a notion of  how important wom-
en’s vote was for women and other actors, what factors stood in the way of  women’s 
suffrage, and what other considerations and events made it possible in different coun-
tries at different points of  time in history. It also allows us to retell the history of  citi-
zenship, as a rights-holding status, from a woman’s perspective, and to place women’s 
persistent under-representation in traditionally male domains of  power in a historical 
context.
This reminiscence of  the history and unfolding of  the concept of  women’s citizen-
ship comes at a time when Europe’s gender equality model is gradually departing from 
a narrowly conceived equal rights/opportunities framework in order to embrace a 
new democratic framework,3 which actively seeks the disestablishment of  the sep arate 
spheres tradition that was entrenched, rather than challenged, with the consolidation 
of  modern states in Europe.4 In doing so, Europe has been advancing towards wom-
en’s full citizenship, a task only initiated when women were politically enfranchised, 
but has as of  yet not been fully completed.
This article starts by laying out the theoretical framing underlying the gendered 
construction of  citizenship in Western political thought during the transition to 
modernity (Section 2). Section 3 describes the relevant actors in the fight, includ-
ing the Church and political parties, explaining their often paradoxical behavior as 
a result of  collisions between principle and strategy. The specific contribution of, and 
challenges faced by, women’s activism in general, and suffragism in particular, are 
described under Section 4. Section 5 discusses the impact that the separate spheres 
ideology had on both the narratives supporting and resisting female suffrage, and on 
the selective and piecemeal way in which suffrage was eventually won by women in 
European countries. Section 6 identifies the main factors and the synergies between 
them, accounting for women’s earlier or later achievement of  suffrage in different 
European nations. Section 7 explores the connection between women’s access to 
voting rights and to civil and social rights, retelling a story of  women’s citizenship 
which is an inverted image of  that developed by T.H. Marshall on the basis of  the male 
paradigm. Section 8 concludes by bringing us to the present to discuss the persist-
ent political under-representation of  women in Europe, as well as a growing aware-
ness about the need to ensure women’s full citizenship through measures that seek 
the incorporation of  women in male spheres of  power and the disestablishment of  
the sexual contract, something which the historical conquest of  suffrage could not 
achieve by itself.
2 See the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe: votIng to Become cItIzenS (Blanca Rodríguez-Ruiz & Ruth 
Rubio-Marín eds., 2012).
3 Ruth Rubio-Marín, A New European Parity-Democracy Sex Equality Model and Why it Won’t Fly in the US, 
60(1) am. J. comP. l. 99 (2012).
4 Blanca Rodríguez Ruiz & Ruth Rubio-Marín, The gender of  representation: On democracy, equality and parity, 
6(2) Int’l J. conSt. l. 287 (2008).
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2. The theoretical framing: transition to modernity and 
female citizenship
Women’s access to suffrage responded to the dynamics at play in the creation of  
modern states and the definition of  male and female citizenship in the republican 
and liberal traditions of  citizenship. In both these traditions, the new modern sub-
ject was from the start a gendered subject: namely, one shaped by symbolically male 
features, and represented as abstract, disembodied, rational, impartial, and indepen-
dent. While the liberal tradition ignored sex-specific particularity, the republican one 
transcended it.5
Starting with the latter, with its roots in Aristotle and Machiavelli, the republican 
tradition conceived of  citizens as economically independent, and therefore as hav-
ing enough resources and time to devote themselves to the business of  governing the 
city, and as politically autonomous in being able to form their own judgment about 
the common good without depending on superiors.6 It also prioritized citizen soldiers 
who, unlike mercenaries, were willing to defend the polity because they had a stake in 
it. Both arguments were combined in justifying the exclusion of  women, an exclusion 
which the French Revolution reproduced. If  men expressed their contribution to the 
common good, and thus their citizenship through their military duties, the repub-
lican model for women, and thus the container of  their “citizenship persona,” their 
sex-specific and nature-dictated form of  patriotism, was motherhood. In their role as 
mothers, women were seen as reproductive vessels instilling love for republican vir-
tues, and acting as guardians of  virtues and morals.7 All of  this was to take place 
in the private sphere, a sphere conceptualized as both separate and subordinate to 
the male-inhabited and male-defined public sphere. Thus, while during the French 
Revolution women were at first allowed to participate in public debates and meetings,8 
already in 1793, women’s clubs were being prohibited. It was not through their direct 
political participation that women were expected to contribute to the res publica. In 
fact, French women only got the right to vote as late as 1944.
Nor were women regarded as equal citizens in the liberal tradition. Liberalism was 
grounded in an axiological framework that aspired to be universal and transcend 
particularism. Calling on an undifferentiated human nature and conceiving of  
individuals as naturally free, it developed a language of  freedom and rights. Yet, in 
the bourgeois society, where the liberal discourse developed, the only subjects and 
rights-holders were those endowed with property (including of  the self), those who 
could sustain themselves,9 and those who were more generally subjected to no one. 
5 ruth lISter, fIona WIllIamS, annelI antonen, et al., cItIzenShIP: femInISt PerSPectIveS 71 (2d ed. 2003).
6 This of  course was the reasoning used to justify the exclusion not only of  women, but also of  the poor, the 
non-tax-payers, the non-land-owners, and, in general, the working classes.
7 lISter, supra note 5.
8 Joan B. Landes, The Performance of  Citizenship: Democracy, Gender and Difference in the French Revolution, in 
democracy and dIfference: conteStIng the BoundarIeS of the PolItIcal 305 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
9 ruth lISter, fIona WIllIamS, annelI antonen, et al., genderIng cItIzenShIP In WeStern euroPe: neW challengeS 
for cItIzenShIP In a croSS-natIonal context 21 (2007).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icon/article-abstract/12/1/4/628588
by UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA user
on 08 June 2018
The achievement of  female suffrage in Europe 7
Just like republicanism, liberalism constructed the myth of  the independence and self-
sufficiency of  the political being. To do this, liberalism shaped the individual as self-
possessed. Self-ownership (the requirement that citizens own property in their own 
persons) was recognized as the basis for political subjects, and constituted the move 
by which women, as creatures of  feeling and not reason, were excluded from the 
polity.10 Women remained excluded even when, with the advances of  industrializa-
tion and the workers’ class struggle, the “property/liberty” connection to citizenship 
was expanded to include not only ownership, but also capacity of  producing prop-
erty through wage labor, and the economic domain—as opposed to just the politi-
cal domain—became increasingly perceived as a “public” domain.11 Women were 
primarily defined simply as property in the private, and this precluded their capac-
ity to benefit from ownership in the public.12 In other words, liberalism constructed 
a self-possessed individual as male, displacing the manifestations of  men’s depen-
dency linked to social reproduction onto women. This resulted in modernity sealing 
a sexual contract,13 a contract of  fraternity, whereby men assigned women the role 
of  sexual and reproductive labor, articulating a division of  spheres and gender roles. 
Women, especially married women, often appeared as the flip-side of  autonomy, and 
were therefore excluded from the holding and/or managing of  property, all or some 
forms of  paid employment and professions, as well as political participation. Even in 
Britain, the country with the oldest form of  parliamentary representation, women 
did not get full voting rights before 1928, and this only after long and convoluted 
struggles.14
The separation of  spheres and the relegation of  women to that of  domesticity, as 
both a distinctly female sphere, but also a subordinate domain, was thereby at the 
foundation of  modern democracies. While in French law, the obedience and subordi-
nation of  the wife under her master’s command was conceptualized as a repub lican 
virtue, legitimized by the superior interest of  the public good, in English common 
law, the regime of  community of  the spouses, the so-called common-law doctrine of  
10 See Elizabeth Mayes, Private Property, the Private Subject and Women, in femInISm confrontS homo economIcuS. 
gender, laW and SocIety 119 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
11 See nItza BerkovItch, from motherhood to cItIzenShIP: Women’S rIghtS and InternatIonal organIzatIonS 13 
(1999).
12 See Mayes, supra note 10, at 125. The private-property-holder paradigm was male too, relying on the 
model of  an “owner-actor whose economic power derives from freedom of  mobility, autonomy from rela-
tional limitations and a singular construction of  responsibility.”
13 Id.
14 The sexual contract was also at the foundation of  the American Revolution. Despite the proclamation of  
the universalistic, democratic, and liberal rights on which it was based, it was also led by British-descended, 
North-American, male colonists, most of  whom “led patriarchal families structured in accordance with 
English common law, with wives performing the duties assigned them by their ruling husbands.” See 
Rogers M. Smith, The Distinctive Barriers to Gender Equality, in haS lIBeralISm faIled Women? aSSurIng equal 
rePreSentatIon In euroPe and the unIted StateS 185, 186–187 (Jytte Klausen & Charles S. Maier eds., 2001). 
Indeed, women gained suffrage only with the passage of  the XIXth Amendment to the US Constitution 
in 1920, and democratic theorists in America such as Alexis de Tocqueville were just as influenced by 
the separate spheres tradition as their European counterparts. See John Markoff, Margins, Centers, and 
Democracy: The Paradigmatic History of  Women’s Suffrage, 29(1) SIgnS: J. Women In culture & Soc’y 90 (2003).
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coverture, meant that the woman lived under the “cover” of  her husband, who—as 
the head of  household—enjoyed the status of  civil citizenship. The legal subordi-
nation of  married women was more than a simple matter of  exclusion: it helped to 
“define civil citizenship, for it was by protecting, subsuming and even owning others 
that white male property owners and family heads became citizens.”15
In the end, then, the republican as well as the liberal model converged in the basic 
differentiation between the public and the private sphere, relegating women to the lat-
ter. Indeed, most of  the theoreticians of  the bourgeois society (including Hegel, Kant, 
and Rousseau) insisted on the special role of  women within the family, where a princ-
iple of  dominance and hierarchy vis-à-vis married women went unchallenged in both 
the liberal property-ownership and the republican soldier/motherhood models. The 
principle of  domination was secured by requiring the wife’s obedience and subordina-
tion to the husband’s “right of  command” and by her economic dependence, anchored 
in the husband’s rights to administer her property and the earnings from her work.16 
Domination and a gender-specific division of  labor were jointly and foundationally 
established, and the tensions with the modern concept of  citizenship, grounded on 
the principles of  freedom and equality of  all men, which signaled a radical break from 
traditional ideas of  society as composed of  natural hierarchies and inequalities, were 
simply waived away as being natural.
In view of  this, it is hardly surprising that in many European countries the mod-
ern legal order in fact came to deprive women of  the suffrage rights they had enjoyed 
under the political institutions of  the “Ancient Regime,” linked to feudal notions 
of  status or to the ownership of  property. Where they existed, as in Sweden,17 the 
Netherlands,18 and some pre-unitary Italian states (including the Grand Duchy 
of  Tuscany, Lombardy, and the Venetian Region),19 these rights were indeed the 
exception. They were granted to (some) noblewomen and to taxpaying women 
in some lands for some elections (often municipal or provincial), and were often 
indirect. However, far from expanding women’s voting rights along with men’s, 
both modern electoral laws and the new constitutions of  the time came to deprive 
women of  (or further restrict) their previous limited voting rights. Sometimes this 
was done by rendering explicit the idea that the gender-neutral formulation of  the 
concept of  “citizenship” meant in fact only men. This was notably the case with the 
electoral laws of  1848 in Hungary,20 1907 in the Austrian half  of  the Habsburg 
15 Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, Civil Citizenship Against Social Citizenship, in the condItIon of cItIzenShIP 90, 
88 (Bart van Steenbergen ed., 1994).
16 lISter et al., supra note 9, at 35.
17 Lena Wängnerud, How Women Gained Suffrage in Sweden: A Weave of  Alliances, in the Struggle for female 
Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 241, at 242.
18 Inge Bleijenbergh & Jet Bussemaker, The Women’s Vote in the Netherlands, in the Struggle for female Suffrage 
In euroPe, supra note 2, 175, at 177.
19 Susanna Mancini, From the Struggle for Suffrage to the Construction of  a Fragile Gender Citizenship: Italy 
1861–2009, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 373, at 375.
20 Csilla Kollonay-Lehoczky, Development Defined by Paradoxes: Hungarian History and Female Suffrage, in the 
Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 421, at 421.
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Empire,21 1865 in Italy,22 1866 in Sweden,23 and 1887 in the Netherlands,24 all of  
which explicitly excluded women from the vote altogether.
3. Political actors in the struggle: between strategy and 
principle
The allocation of  men and women to separate spheres was both a reality and a self-
reinforcing ideological construct. They often converged in the creation of  synergies 
accounting for the disassociation of  men’s and women’s franchise and the impossibil-
ity of  a single democratization agenda. Women often indeed lacked economic inde-
pendence, education, paid employment, and professional opportunities similar to 
those of  men at the time of  the fight for universal suffrage. Women’s relegation to 
the sphere of  domesticity, where they were expected to reproduce and to nourish the 
mores and the traditional culture, allowed making predictions about the conserva-
tive, traditional, and religiously affected political behavior that women would have, 
had they been allowed to vote. To those most concerned with advancing the new 
modern order, these predictions often advised postponing female suffrage on strategic 
grounds in order to concentrate on what were perceived as the truly serious remnants 
of  a “pre-modern” or “illegitimate” political order to be overcome, such as the lack of  
re cognition of  universal male suffrage or the limitation of  non-democratically legiti-
mized sources of  authority, including that of  the Monarchy or the Church; or that of  
imperial or colonial powers. Those in favor of  female suffrage, often including conser-
vative and religious parties, for the most part shared these predictions about women’s 
nature and inclinations, and thus saw in the female electorate the possibility to pre-
serve a threatened order from the excesses of  modernity.
The prevalence of  strategic reasoning, and the low profile of  the enlightenment 
ideas of  freedom, justice, and equality, in the discussion of  female suffrage, are indeed 
noteworthy. Granted, some progressive political parties in several countries—includ-
ing socialist, liberal, or republican parties—embraced the new enlightened language, 
and saw in the new modern state a true promise of  rights and democracy for all, 
including women. Such principled language certainly bore some weight in some con-
crete cases, as in the debates about female suffrage held in the Spanish Constituent 
Assembly in 1931.25 However, the European debate around female suffrage was over-
all widely dominated by strategy. Strategy prevailed in positions in favor of  and against 
female suffrage and understandings about women’s nature and likely behavior, as well 
as the prioritization of  other political causes, had a clear impact on when female suf-
frage was recognized, and whose actions ended up being mainly responsible for it.
21 Birgitta Bader-Zaar, Gaining the Vote in a World in Transition: Female Suffrage in Austria, in the Struggle for 
female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 191, at 192–203, 196.
22 Mancini, supra note 19, at 375.
23 Wängnerud, supra note 17, at 242–243.
24 Bleijenbergh & Bussemaker, supra note 18, at 177.
25 Ana Aguado, Constructing Women’s Citizenship: The Conquest of  Suffrage and Women’s Political Rights in 
Spain, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 289, at 293–295.
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The creation of  mass parties at the end of  the nineteenth century had turned women 
into attractive potential campaigners, and possibly even voters. Some political par-
ties felt the urge to recruit women by appealing to causes dear to them. Sometimes 
this translated into support for female suffrage, yet most often it did not, and women 
remained mostly instrumental in achieving political parties’ further aims. In several 
countries in particular, the fight for women’s equal rights was regarded as a threat to 
workers’ rights and livelihoods. Indeed, many socialist parties and other left-wing or 
progressive forces held an ambivalent position towards female suffrage. This means that 
they were willing to compromise equality-based commitments they embraced in theory, 
arguing at least for the postponement of  female suffrage until male universal suffrage 
was achieved. Expanding the vote to women on the same conditions as men (which at 
the time often meant enfranchising only women of  property or those who paid taxes) 
was seen as a direct threat to the socialist class struggle. Thus, although socialism in 
theory prided itself  on supporting the cause of  women’s emancipation, the issue was 
considered secondary, or even subversive, with feminists’ efforts by definition being 
suspected of  bourgeois tendencies. The First International (1864–1867) was hostile 
toward wage labor for women and unenthusiastic about allowing women into politics. 
The Second International had a more positive attitude about the women’s cause, but it 
adopted the official policy that prohibited cooperation with bourgeois groups.26 Socialist 
women were simply expected to focus their energies on the socialist movement and not 
on women’s rights.27 In 1875, for instance, women’s alleged reactionary political ten-
dencies constituted the most important argument against including women’s suffrage 
in the founding documents of  the German Social Democratic Party.28
Privileging class struggle was not the only relevant consideration, however. 
Nationalist struggles, and fights to limit the power of  the Church and the monarchy, 
were often as important in explaining support or resistance to the franchise of  women 
from political parties. In Luxemburg, to mention a case, liberals opposed female suf-
frage because they thought it would threaten their aspirations to limit the sovereign 
power of  the Crown and the influence of  the Catholic Church.29 Similarly, in Italy, 
although “communists after World War II perceived women as crucial in the con-
struction of  consent within the newborn democracy,” they were still only half-heart-
edly committed to the cause, fearing the “Vatican’s influence on women’s vote.”30  
26 Even among feminist socialists, clear commitment to suffrage for all men and women—as opposed to 
a strategy of  male universal suffrage first—was only expressed in the First International Conference of  
Socialist Women held in 1907 in conjunction with the International Socialist Congress. Only after that 
did women delegates commit to mobilize the whole International for the cause. See BerkovItch, supra note 
11, at 32–33.
27 lee ann BanaSzak, Why movementS Succeed or faIl: oPPortunIty, culture and the Struggle for Woman Suffrage 
203 (1996).
28 Ellen Carol DuBois, Woman Suffrage around the World: Three Phases of  Suffragist Internationalism, in Suffrage 
and Beyond, supra note 1, 252, at 253.
29 Sonja Kmec, Female Suffrage in Luxembourg, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 159, 
at 165.
30 Mancini, supra note 19, at 383–384. In fact, communist militants would later blame women’s “conserva-
tive vote” for the defeat of  their party in the political elections of  1946 and 1948 (id. at 384).
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In France too, “women’s right to vote was thus bound up with political struggles 
between religious and anticlerical movements, the former invoking tradition and 
often the monarchy, the latter supporting progress and the Republic,”31 some-
thing which explains why the Radical Party especially, but also the Socialist, and 
Communist Party, resisted female suffrage. Although, for the most part, women 
were expected to be, and indeed were, involved in struggles for autonomy against 
imperial or colonial powers, whenever female suffrage was thought to delay the 
country’s journey towards independence, it was also resisted on such grounds. 
This was, for instance, the case in Poland and Ireland: in the latter, the home rule 
debate, with its religious overtones, ensured tensions between gender equality and 
nationalist aspirations at the end of  the nineteenth century and in the early twen-
tieth century.32
The easy predisposition of  political parties to sacrifice justice for women and 
women’s aspirations for the sake of  other “more important, urgent or compelling” 
causes meant that the achievement of  female suffrage was many times the result of  
a joint effort between strange political bed-fellows. A combination of  left-wing forces 
(defending female suffrage on principled grounds) and right-wing forces (doing the 
same on strategic grounds) was indeed not an uncommon formula. In Belgium, 
Catholics offered their support for universal male franchise, a Socialist claim, in return 
for Socialist support for local female franchise and, in the end, it was the Catholics 
and the Communists who submitted a bill granting women national suffrage to par-
liament in 1945.33 In Luxembourg, female suffrage was achieved as a result of  an 
alliance between the socialists supporting the cause on principle, and conservatives 
acting strategically in the belief  that women would support Christian values, fight 
alcoholism, and support the Monarchy, all against the opposition of  liberals (who 
feared women’s conservative vote).34 Thus, ironically, in many European countries, 
Catholic and/or other conservative forces ended up supporting female suffrage in the 
belief  that women would vote conservative, restrain the excesses of  liberalism and the 
proletarian and revolutionary struggle, including communism and secularism, and 
uphold traditional family values. As a result of  this, some countries experienced the 
emergence of  a very conservative “Christian feminism.” This was the case in both 
France35 and Italy,36 especially after Pope Benedict XV’s declaration in favor of  wom-
en’s enfranchisement in 1919.
31 Sylvie Chaperon, The Difficult Struggle for Women’s Political Rights in France, in the Struggle for female 
Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 305, at 314.
32 The situation in Poland can be found in Małgorzata Fuszara, Polish Women’s Fight for Suffrage, in the 
Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 143, at 146; and Ireland in Myrtle Hill, Divisions and 
Debates: The Irish Suffrage Experience, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 257, at 
261.
33 Petra Meier, Caught Between Strategic Positions and Principles of  Equality: Female Suffrage in Belgium, in the 
Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 407, at 412.
34 See Kmec, supra note 29, at 166–168.
35 See Chaperon, supra note 31, at 313–314.
36 See Mancini, supra note 19, at 379.
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4. Women’s fight for female suffrage: suffragism and the 
challenge of  speaking with a single voice
The sacrifice of  women’s full political rights for the sake of  other political priorities 
meant that, to a large extent, women in the fight for female suffrage were unable to 
rely on the political-party structure system. At the same time, women’s associations, 
which started to flourish in many parts of  Europe around the mid-1850s, mostly led 
by educated, politically connected, and bourgeois women, often prioritized causes 
other than suffrage, including access to education, employment, and professional 
development. In fact, sharing many of  the assumptions about the likeliness of  wom-
en’s regressive political behavior (at least until they became more politically educated, 
and had the means to ensure financial independence from their husbands and moral 
independence from the Church), many enlightened feminists too feared that female 
suffrage could hold back the reforms brought by liberalism and modernity.
Partly as a reaction to the inaction of  all other relevant actors, including politi-
cal parties, and partly expressing dissatisfaction with the limited agenda of  women’s 
bourgeois associations, suffragist organizations proliferated at the turn of  the century 
forming a suffragist movement with international ambitions. The institutional fea-
tures and tactics of  suffragist organizations varied. Although most were independent 
organizations, many—including those which were often most successful—had party 
connections, and some were even created as a branch of  a political party. While most 
pursued suffrage through the means accorded by the political system, some—notably 
the suffragettes in the UK—were more radical in their methods. They defended differ-
ent forms of  civil disobedience when necessary, and, like the members of  the Women’s 
Social and Political Union in Britain, engaged in very unconventional activities, which 
included arson and hunger strikes in prison, as expressions of  what Mrs. Pankhurst 
called a “civil war” waged by women.37
Nearly all of  the organizations were in contact with, and were influenced by, the 
suffrage movements in other countries and international organizations. Indeed, the 
cause of  female suffrage provided the first occasion for international mobilization in 
the fight for women’s rights. The fight was spearheaded by the women’s temperance 
movement, which, initially rooted in the US, had also gained an international dimen-
sion.38 The emergence of  a newly militant suffragism was influenced by the upsurge of  
socialist politics at the end of  the nineteenth century, but was ideologically and organ-
izationally independent from it. This form of  suffragism had its roots in England, but its 
branches reached out over much of  the rest of  the world, with the International Woman 
Suffrage Association being established between 1899 and 1902. Initially viewed as a 
37 See Emmeline Pankhurst, When Civil War is Waged by Women, in femInISm: the eSSentIal hIStorIcal WrItIngS 
296 (Miriam Schneir ed., 1972).
38 The Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) was formed in the United States in 1874 as a con-
ventional Protestant women’s organization with a narrow moral reform focus; it went on to become a 
more ambitious and politically articulated organization. In 1884, it led to the formation of  the World’s 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union, which had great impact in Australia and New Zealand’s early 
winning of  suffrage. See Dubois, supra note 28, at 256.
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working class initiative, suffragist militancy ended up recruiting women of  all venues, 
as it came to challenge dominant definitions of  womanhood articulated around the 
separation of  public and private spheres.39
Although suffragist movements ended up making a significant contribution towards 
women’s suffrage in most countries, the movement was also subject to internal dis-
putes and divisions, similar to those encountered by women’s movements more gener-
ally. These internal divisions and conflicts of  loyalty made it often difficult to achieve 
a common front in the fight for women’s suffrage. The sources of  conflict differed, but 
were often interrelated. One serious source of  divisiveness was the question of  loyalty 
to a political party versus loyalty to the cause of  women’s franchise, or even, more 
generally, women’s rights. Often, as mentioned, parties paid lip-service to women’s 
empowerment, but were more than willing to postpone it. In the UK, for instance, the 
liberal government repeatedly disappointed women. Expressing frustration with the 
lack of  commitment of  a party to their cause, women were then compelled to organ-
ize separately, either within or outside the party. This was something that political 
parties did not always welcome. Indeed, they were often eager to discipline what was 
perceived as women’s political promiscuity, limiting their ability to step outside the 
bounds of  party lines in their pursuit of  a common cause. Examples abound about the 
difficulties women fighting for suffrage encountered if  they wished to transcend party 
allegiances. In Sweden, women rebelled against their party of  reference (in this case 
the Conservative Party) by founding a separate branch, but then had great difficulty in 
participating in suffragist associations that recruited members from the entire politi-
cal spectrum.40 In Italy, “between 1906 and 1908, socialist, Catholic, and bourgeois 
women’s associations cooperated intensively on the issue on women’s suffrage, but 
this alliance did not last long.”41 This is possibly one of  the main reasons why female 
suffrage was achieved very late.
Particularly complex, as hinted earlier, was the relationship between feminism and 
socialism, and the way it pitted class against gender struggles. Indeed, by the early 
twentieth century, a strong feminist movement began to develop within international 
socialism. This movement had to struggle against both the sexism of  male socialists 
and the social conservatism of  middle-class women’s movements. The largest socialist 
women’s movements were formed in Germany, the United States, and Austria. Clara 
Zetkin became international socialism’s best known leader. The movement embraced 
political equality as one of  its main objectives, and proposed a distinctively socialist 
argument for women suffrage, based on the recognition that “the increasingly public 
character of  women’s labour had to be matched with an equally public political role.”42 
Socialist suffragists encouraged the creation of  women-only international fora—from 
1907 through 1915, an informal women’s international with annual conferences 
took place—as well as independent women’s organizations within socialist parties. 
39 Id. at 265.
40 Wangnerud, supra note 17, at 250.
41 See Mancini, supra note 19, at 378.
42 Dubois, supra note 28, at 261, 263.
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The fact that these saw the light of  day in the United States, Austria, Scandinavia, and 
Germany, probably influenced women’s faster track to suffrage in these countries as 
compared to others, such as France or Italy, where such semi-autonomous organiza-
tions never developed.43 At the same time, collaboration beyond party lines remained 
a challenge. Although the Second International had a more positive attitude towards 
women’s causes, it adopted an official policy that prohibited cooperation with bour-
geois groups. A price was paid for disobedience. In Denmark, for instance, the Social 
Democratic Party never recognized an ideologically akin women’s organization (in 
this case, the Social Democratic Women’s Suffrage Association) because of  its coop-
eration with women not affiliated to the party.
Participation in war, especially during World War I, also stood in the way of  women 
making suffrage a common front and a clear priority. Thus, although the majority of  
suffragists in combatant countries advocated “preparedness, war work, and service to 
the state,” some were decisively pacifist and led the formation of  the international fem-
inist pacifist network called the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.44 
That the cause had the potential to split the suffrage movement in two is shown in the 
German example, where World War I ended up dividing German feminists into paci-
fists and nationalists supporting the war.45
Divisions along ethno-cultural and racial lines, or nationalist struggles also divided 
women in many European countries. These divisions were not always insurmount-
able, but sometimes they truly were. In the complex social and political context of  
Habsburg Austria, ethnic and nationalistic loyalties, as well as suffrage struggles 
between liberals, socialists, and Catholics, got in the way of  a united suffrage move-
ment.46 Similar was the case of  Switzerland, where tension between socialists and 
Catholic movements had the effect of  dividing the suffrage organizations, and the 
cultural differences and language barriers between the different regions made a 
unified effort difficult to achieve.47 The language question also caused a division of  
the Finnish Women’s Association.48 In Ireland, membership in suffrage societies 
was depleted by defections to newly formed female nationalist or unionist organiza-
tions.49 On the other side of  the Atlantic, the split of  the movement also took place 
over racial justice issues. In the US, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B.  Anthony 
of  the more radical National Woman’s Suffrage Association broke with the abolition 
tradition. Advocating women’s rights first and foremost, they opposed the ratification 
of  the XVth Amendment, arguing that it put black enfranchisement ahead of  women. 
43 Id. at 263.
44 Id. at 269.
45 See Ute Sacksofsky, Winning Women’s Vote in Germany, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra 
note 2, 127, at 134.
46 See Bader-Zaar, supra note 21, at 191, at 191–202.
47 See BanaSzak, supra note 72, at 203–206, 211–212; BeatrIx meSmer, auSgeklammert, eIngeklammert: frauen 
und frauenorganISatIonen In der SchWeIz deS 19. JahrhundertS 92, 187 (1988).
48 See Aura Korppi-Tommola, A Long Tradition of  Equality: Women’s Suffrage in Finland, in the Struggle for 
female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 47, at 49.
49 See Hill, supra note 32, at 261.
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Instead, the more moderate American Woman Suffrage Association maintained its 
alliance with the old abolition cause.50
Beyond institutional struggles and fights about the importance of  engaging in 
causes other than women’s emancipation, many of  the tensions were truly internal 
to the women’s emancipation movement—including suffragist organizations. These 
tensions had to do with the relative importance of  women’s suffrage in the quest for 
women’s liberation: an instance of  the feminist movement’s difficulty speaking in 
a single voice. In general, while proletarian women fought for equal pay for equal 
work, the extension of  protection of  maternity rights, and employment protection for 
women, middle-class women struggled first and foremost for access to education and 
professional training, regarding access to higher education as a prerequisite for active 
citizenship.51
A related source of  dispute was the question of  whether full and equal suffrage 
should be granted to all women or only to those who were educated and literate, 
reflecting a tension between a transformative enlightened agenda, on the one hand, 
and inclusive politics, on the other. In Britain, suffragists struggled over whether to 
go for female votes on the same basis as men (that is, as householders), which was 
the position of  most suffragists, or rather to begin by trying to obtain voting rights for 
unmarried women, as some suffragist argued in the 1870s and 1880s.52 In Greece, 
for instance, a couple of  years after women had been granted limited voting rights, the 
suffragist movement split between those who opposed anything but full suffrage rights 
for local elections, and those who insisted on women retaining the voting rights they 
already had, with most upper- and middle-class educated people (women and men 
alike) contesting universal suffrage for women.53
5. The power of  ideology: women’s enfranchisement, 
motherhood and the sexual contract
The fact that at the time political parties did not care enough, or cared more about 
other things, and that women’s movements did not easily agree on the absolute and 
relative importance of  suffrage is only part of  the story behind the delayed enfran-
chisement of  women. A careful look at the positions of  many of  the relevant actors in 
several European countries shows the resistance exercised by the dominant ideology 
affirming the separate spheres tradition. Tellingly, many of  the arguments either in 
support of, or against, the franchise alluded explicitly to women’s distinct position or 
experience in the family, and to their caring nature as mothers.
50 See Janet zollInger gIele, tWo PathS to Women’S equalIty: temPerence, Suffrage, and the orIgInS of modern 
femInISm 114 (1995).
51 lISter et al., supra note 9, at 38.
52 See Krista Cowman, Female Suffrage in Great Britain, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 
2, 273, at 275–276.
53 See Demetra Samiou, So Difficult to be Considered as Citizens: The History of  Women’s Suffrage in Greece, 
1864–2001, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 439, at 444.
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Arguments concerning women’s caring nature and their role as mothers, as well as 
their political relevance, were most often relied upon by conservative political forces 
opposing female suffrage. Female suffrage, it was said, was politically contentious 
because it could undermine family harmony and generate social instability. Instead, 
women were to be represented by the men, as the heads of  the family household. Two 
contradictory arguments were thus lumped together. On the one hand, the argument 
that women’s suffrage was unnecessary, because “their men” already represented 
women’s interests, assumed unity of  interests as the only conceivable scenario. On 
the other hand, the idea that women’s suffrage could disrupt family harmony rests on 
the possibility of  a clash of  interests, and advocates the subordination of  women as 
the only solution. In Sweden, for instance, a parliamentary commission was formed 
and put in charge of  investigating the potential consequences of  female suffrage on 
birth rates and marriage.54 And in the UK, one of  the arguments that Liberal Prime 
Minister William Gladstone held in stubborn resistance to female suffrage was that 
women could be potentially corrupted by politics, and thereby threaten the family.55
The perception of  suffrage as a threat to the family order also explained why women, 
seeing suffrage as threatening the natural order of  things, sometimes went as far as to 
organize against their own enfranchisement. In Britain, for instance, women were active 
in the National League for Opposing Women’s Suffrage, founded in 1908.56 The separate 
spheres tradition held out the promise of  “economic subsistence and a defined social place 
as a wife to women from all respectable classes.”57 And whereas women’s economic oppor-
tunities had indeed improved by the end of  the nineteenth century, they were still very 
limited. So much so that working-class women had reasons to fear having to compete eco-
nomically against men, as anti-suffragists claimed they would be compelled to do if  the 
sexed-order of  society came to be challenged.58 Also, middle-class husbands could offer 
their wives a more comfortable existence than spinsters could provide for themselves.59
While some feared that women’s vote would disrupt family life, the argument 
that, as mothers and providers of  care, women were unsuited for political concerns 
was sometimes turned on its head. Not only did suffragists draw on the examples of  
Australia and New Zealand to show that votes for women had not led to a neglect of  
homes and families,60 many also sustained that, on the contrary, motherhood made 
for good and caring citizens, particularly suited to act in local politics.61 Women’s 
54 Wangnerud, supra note 17, at 248.
55 Hill, supra note 32, at 265, quoting from citations in SuSan k. kent, Sex and Suffrage In BrItaIn 1860–
1914, at 54–55 (1990).
56 See Cowman, supra note 52, at 285.
57 Pateman, supra note 1, at 341.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 marIan SaWer & marIan SImmS, a Woman’S Place: Women and PolItIcS In auStralIa 10–16 (2d ed. 1993).
61 These arguments connect with some current positions on citizenship in general, and on women’s citizen-
ship in particular. See, in this line, Nancy Fraser’s proposal of  a model of  citizenship based on the notion 
of  the universal caregiver: Nancy Fraser, Gender Equity and the Welfare State: A  Postindustrial Thought 
Experiment, in democracy and dIfference, supra note 8, 219, at 234–236. See also Joan Tronto, Care as the 
Work of  Citizens. A Modest Proposal, in Women and cItIzenShIP 130 (Marilyn Friedman ed., 2003).
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alleged nature, suited for home work and caring, was relied upon by the conservative 
camp in those instances where they supported their political inclusion. The nation 
would benefit if  women’s natural inclinations to care were put to public service, it 
was argued, especially at a time when the legislative concern with social welfare was 
increasing. If  women were included in the public sphere, they would stand for patri-
otic motherhood.
Interestingly, many women and even female activists shared the view that men’s 
and women’s contributions to the nation were of  a different kind, pertaining to dif-
ferent spheres. Indeed, as discussed, not all women’s organizations placed suffrage 
rights among their priority demands. But even among those that did, the key dividing 
line was between egalitarians and “maternalists.” The former relied on considerations 
of  justice, calling on the universal language of  individual freedom and equality, and 
underscoring the fact that what prevented women from participating in the public 
world was not nature itself  but men’s monopoly on education, training, paid employ-
ment, and suffrage.62 The latter based their claims on the different, particular role and 
needs of  women, drawing both on maternal values and women’s caring approach to 
life, which, they said, could and should be put in the service of  the national interest.63 
Further, many middle-class and working class suffragists linked the vote to women’s 
economic independence, regarding it as a way to improve their working conditions 
and their positions as workers in male-dominated workplaces. But for other suffrag-
ists, including those who were recruited from the women’s temperance movement, 
suffrage was vital to strengthen women’s position in private life, and eliminate men’s 
domestic tyranny.64 It seems that in the end pro-suffrage voices often managed to suc-
cessfully combine several types of  arguments in arguing their case, some affirming 
and some subverting the separate spheres ideology.65
Most European countries ended up articulating a compromise between approaches 
to women’s nature and social roles by limiting the suffrage granted to them to either 
some forms of  political participation or some groups of  women, in ways that would 
affirm rather than challenge the separate spheres tradition. In many countries, 
including the UK, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, and Romania, women were granted 
the right to vote in local elections while still excluded from parliamentary elections. 
This disjuncture is understandable if  we bear in mind that, while national vot-
ing was perceived as the primary sphere of  politics proper, local politics was often 
regarded as an extension of  family and neighborhood concerns. Women’s participa-
tion in local politics could thus be seen as an extension of  women’s private tasks, or, 
in other words, as putting to public use the caring and managing skills developed by 
62 This was the argument most heavily relied upon by the International Women Suffrage Association. See 
BerkovItch, supra note 11, at 26.
63 lISter et al., supra note 9, at 39.
64 Indeed, the temperance cause was addressed to those who defined women as particularly responsible for 
personal and domestic concerns. Its main mission was to protect families from the “rum cause” (that is, 
drunk men) through the imposition of  legal restrictions, for which women’s vote was needed. In this way, 
the good of  the family and political equality were reconciled. BerkovItch, supra note 11, 29.
65 Pateman, supra note 1, at 337.
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women in the private domain, while still leaving the public arena to men.66 This also 
explains why, before they gained suffrage, women were also allowed to participate 
in school boards in the UK and boards of  guardians for the distribution of  relief  to 
sick, unemployed, widowed, and destitute in both the UK and Ireland,67 as well as 
in social aid boards and councils addressing the needs of  children and the young in 
Denmark.68
The gradual approach to women’s political inclusion was consistent with the 
drawing of  lines not only between types of  suffrage and forms of  participation and 
public involvement, but also between types of  women. In many European countries, 
women who were functionally seen as closer to men (instead of  neatly nested in the 
sexual contract) were put on a faster track to political participation. This functional 
closeness of  women to men was measured in terms of  both economic self-sufficiency 
and marital/family status. Women who paid taxes, owned property, and were heads 
of  households, economically active, unmarried or widowed, were among those 
who were often prioritized in this process of  selective enfranchisement. In the UK, 
for instance, female suffrage was first granted to women with property,69 while in 
Finland, Iceland, and Sweden (though not in Denmark) unmarried and economically 
active women gained the vote before other groups.70 Functional closeness to men and 
departure from standard gender norms were thus primordial criterion for selective 
inclusion, as long as a woman did not fall within the category of  “deviant,” as this 
could disqualify them. In some countries, such as Belgium, adulterous women and 
female prostitutes were explicitly left out.71 Similarly, Italy excluded “visible” prosti-
tutes in 1945.72
6. The achievement of  female suffrage: triggering factors, 
synergies, and paradigms
Looking at the histories behind the achievement of  women’s citizenship in different 
European countries over many decades (from the turn of  the century and into the 
1970s), it is impossible to identify a single pattern in the path towards full female 
enfranchising. What we can identify, however, are some factors which contributed to, 
or delayed, women’s access to suffrage, as well as the types of  positive and negative 
synergies that their interactions generated. Some of  these findings seem to unsettle 
common understanding held thus far, mainly by adding complexity.
66 Id. at 339.
67 See Cowman, supra note 52, at 275; Hill, supra note 32, at 260.
68 See Christina Fiig & Birte Siim, Democratisation of  Denmark: The Inclusion of  Women in Political Citizenship, 
in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 61, at 66.
69 See Cowman, supra note 52, at 273.
70 See Fiig & Siim, supra note 68, at 72; ann-dorthe chrIStenSen & BIrte SIIm, køn, demokratI og modernItet. 
mod nye PolItISke IdentIteter 63–64 (2001). For Finland, see also Korppi-Tommola, supra note 48, at 49. 
Concerning Sweden, see also Wangnerud, supra note 17, at 243.
71 Meier, supra note 33, at 412.
72 Mancini, supra note 19, at 382.
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6.1. Contributing factors: unsettling common understandings, adding 
complexity
With a few dramatic exceptions, notably the cases of  England and the United States, 
the achievement of  suffrage at the turn of  the century has often been linked to govern-
ments granting the vote to women in a calculated, top-down, and self-interested man-
ner. Similarly, it has been a common understanding that women’s enfranchisement 
was “on the whole a conservative endeavor, both as regards the forces responsible for 
achieving votes for women and the impact that women’s votes had on political life.”73
However, a careful look at the histories behind the achievement of  female suffrage 
in most European countries shows these to be overbroad generalizations. We have 
mentioned how, in some countries, conservative forces—sometimes including the 
Church and confessional parties—were indeed crucial for the granting of  women’s 
suffrage before World War II. Yet, the stories are more complex than that for it was 
often the alliance between conservative and progressive or left-wing forces that trig-
gered the change. In Italy and Belgium, for example, we actually find communists 
aligning themselves with conservative parties to overcome the ambivalence or pas-
sive resistance of  other parties, including the socialists and the liberals in support of  
female suffrage.74 And stories abound about liberal and socialist parties, and key fig-
ures within them, which played key roles in supporting women’s suffrage, often in 
alliance with women’s groups and suffragists.
Describing women’s access to suffrage as a top-down process also fails to reflect 
the importance of  women’s suffrage movements, and their internationally organized 
contribution to fighting women’s marginalization in the politics of  each nation. In 
fact, women’s determined efforts through the organized labor of  feminist movements 
demanding the vote for women is one of  the factors explaining why in some countries 
women were enfranchised before, or at the end of  the war, whereas in others they 
had to wait longer.75 Indeed, between 1890 and 1930, it was the number of  national 
women’s political organizations demanding the extension of  women’s suffrage in a 
certain country which mostly determined the likelihood of  women gaining suffrage.76
73 But see Dubois, supra note 28, at 252, referring to rIchard evanS’s classic survey, the femInIStS (1978), argu-
ing that this is unsubstantiated by empirical research. Regarding the US, see also Holly J. McCammon & 
Karen E. Campbell, Winning the Vote in the West: The Political Successes of  the Women’s Suffrage Movements, 
1866–1919, 15(1) gender & Soc’y 55 (2001), challenging the standard account which gives responsibility 
to a primarily native, white, male constituency that believed that female voters would bring Puritan norms 
of  behavior into public life, supporting laws restricting saloons and other venues of  gambling and prostitu-
tion. They argue that, instead, women’s access to suffrage came as a result of  suffrage movements’ mobili-
zation as well as contextual factors, including whether major political parties endorsed them and whether 
women were already moving into male domains, particularly in higher education and in the professions.
74 In Italy, before the end of  World War II, Communists and Christian Democrats agreed on supporting 
the women’s vote (Mancini, supra note 19, at 381). In Belgium, after World War II, the Catholic and the 
Communist parties submitted a bill to parliament that would grant women suffrage in 1948. See Meier, 
supra note 33, at 412.
75 Pateman, supra note 1, at 342.
76 See Francisco O. Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal, and Suzanne Shanahan, The Changing Logic of  Political Citizenship: 
Cross-National Acquisition of  Women’s Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 1990, 62(5) am. Soc. rev. 739 (1997).
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Nevertheless, in some countries, the achievement of  female suffrage was indeed a 
top-down process. Some have related this to the fact that from 1931 onwards, and 
especially after World War II, it was “international standards, world culture and iso-
morphism” that become most influential.77 With worldwide decolonization and the 
reorganization of  international politics after World War II, as well as the rise of  a truly 
international women’s movement, national independence became a major catalyst, 
universal franchise being associated with struggles for democracy and the birth of  the 
nation-state.78 By the last quarter of  the twentieth century at the very latest, female 
suffrage had simply become part of  the definition of  what a modern democracy was 
about. Those who fought to bring about a passage to democratization, demanding the 
enlargement of  suffrage to include previously excluded racial categories, the end of  
the one party rule, or the conversion of  old monarchies into parliamentary monar-
chies, almost never attempted an electoral system in which women and men would 
not be treated equally.79 For latecomers to women’s full and equal suffrage rights, such 
as Cyprus or Malta, female suffrage was indeed mostly the result of  the implemen-
tation of  more or less self-imposed international democratic standards representing 
modernization.80
Because sometimes women won the right to vote during, or immediately after, 
World War I, it has also been commonplace to grant the war itself  a positive role in the 
achievement of  female suffrage.81 In some countries, women were indeed rewarded for 
their active contribution to war effort. Additionally, in wartime and during postwar 
reconstruction, the close family household was often torn apart, with women being 
pushed into work and public services in a way that rendered the fiction of  women’s 
relegation to the private sphere more difficult to sustain. This being said, focusing too 
strongly on the war as the main explanatory cause again undermines the work of  gen-
erations of  feminists. Besides, the correlation is far from clear-cut. After all, whereas 
some neutral countries, such as the Netherlands or Scandinavian countries, were 
among the first to grant women the franchise, some combatant countries, includ-
ing France, Italy, and Belgium, only enfranchised women after World War II. In other 
countries, such as England, women’s war contributions played a role in granting 
women the vote, but, more than anything, the war seems to have “provided time and a 
supra-partisan environment for the political forces necessary to enfranchise women to 
mature.”82 Yet, in other countries, such as Germany and Austria, “defeat and revolu-
tion brought in socialist governments which enfranchised women,” and this has been 
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See Sylvia Walby, Is Citizenship Gendered?, 28(2) SocIology 379 (1994).
80 See Kalliope Agapiou-Josephides, Women’s Suffrage in Cyprus, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, 
supra note 2, 453, at 453; and Ruth Farrugia, Female Suffrage in Malta, in the Struggle for female Suffrage 
In euroPe, supra note 2, 389, at 399–400.
81 See, e.g., leS garner, StePPIng StoneS to Women’S lIBerty: femInISt IdeaS In the Women’S Suffrage movement, 
1900–1988, at ch. 7 (1984); Bryan S.  turner, cItIzenShIP and caPItalISm: the deBate over reformISm 60 
(1986).
82 turner, supra note 81, at 269.
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interpreted as an expression of  the fact that a more direct causal role can be attributed 
to the war.83
While women’s participation in World War I might have been a triggering factor in 
some countries, it is a country’s struggle for independence which appears to have been 
a more general galvanizing force. This of  course was natural in the case of  latecomers 
to independent statehood, such as Cyprus or Malta. But this held true more generally, 
and over time—not just after World War II, when such standards were most widely 
spread. One of  the triggering factors of  the early granting of  suffrage to women in 
Finland was women’s successful participation in both the nationalist struggle against 
Russian oppression, and the fight on the language question to defend the affirmation 
of  Finnish instead of  Swedish.84 Similarly, in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, female 
suffrage was, in part, related to the women’s involvement in the nationalist struggle 
against the Russian empire.85 Arguably, women’s undeniable active contribution to 
such causes had to be acknowledged, representing a direct challenge to the notion that 
women were not apt to engage in politics. Furthermore, in some cases, the affirmation 
of  a nationalist agenda weakened, delayed, or contaminated the political polarization 
around the class axis, an axis which in so many ways had the potential to overshadow 
the gender axis. Finally, in several countries, the causal link was not direct, but the 
timing made sense: since the nationalist struggle had divided the women’s movement 
internally and discouraged political parties to prioritize suffragist claims, the overcom-
ing of  such internal division when the national question was eventually resolved sim-
ply allowed women to present a common front and political parties to prioritize the 
cause of  women’s empowerment.86
Other hypotheses have related the achievement of  female suffrage to broader con-
ceptions of  (women’s) citizenship. Notably, in Scandinavian countries, there seems to 
be a tight connection between the early achievement of  civil equality and political 
citizenship rights.87 Also, it has been said that the fact that several of  the countries 
first to grant women suffrage were mostly agrarian societies, such as Finland, Sweden, 
and Denmark, shows that it was the lack of  separation between the home, labor, and 
employment (typical of  an agrarian society) which made the recognition of  women 
as sources of  production more evident, thereby making the construct of  the separate 
spheres less appealing.88
83 Id.
84 See Korppi-Tommola, supra note 48, at 47–48.
85 See, respectively, Helen Biin & Anneli Alby, Suffrage and the Nation: Women’s Vote in Estonia, in the Struggle 
for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 111, at 113; Aija Branta, Winning Women’s Vote: Experience from 
Latvia, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 95, at 95, 101–102; Toma Birmontienė 
& Virginija Jurėnienė, The Development of  Women’s Rights in Lithuania: Striving for Political Equality, in the 
Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 79, at 79.
86 The nationalist struggle played a crucial role in several European countries, including Ireland (see Hill, 
supra note 32, at 261–262, 264); Austria (see Bader-Zaar, supra note 21, at 193, 196–199), and the for-
mer Czechoslovakia (see Dana Musilová, Mothers of  the Nation: Women’s Vote in the Czech Republic, in the 
Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 207, at 209–210).
87 lISter et al., supra note 9, at 31.
88 Id.
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Drawing from Macpherson, Pateman has argued that female suffrage was granted 
in so many countries by the end of  the war because by then the meaning of  the vote 
had undergone a radical change: franchise had been “tamed” both through “the 
development of  the party system and of  the welfare state blunting working-class pres-
sure for reform.”89 In other words, women gained suffrage precisely when suffrage 
had lost much of  its citizenship importance and transformative power in the face of  
the increasing recognition of  social rights. Beyond the connection between social and 
political rights that Pateman refers to, in several European countries, female suffrage 
was indeed granted when suffrage mattered less altogether, including when it was 
relegated to a mainly symbolic role in the definition of  citizenship and the state. The 
granting of  suffrage to women under fascist and communist authoritarian regimes—
that is, in regimes where elections were the façade of  totalitarianism, if  they took place 
at all—seems to be a case in point.
Granting suffrage to women under Communism resonated well with the commu-
nist regimes’ criticism of  private bourgeois family for enslaving women by reducing 
them to the status of  male property. Communist regimes generally dismissed “the 
woman question” as a bourgeois anachronism, as a question which had to be inte-
grated within the wider communist agenda of  social reform. They therefore often 
banned and/or took over women’s organizations. Community sharing of  housework 
and child care, women joining the production line, and their participation in com-
munity affairs through the right to vote and stand for office were promised, aligning 
orthodox Marxism and feminism.90 It is therefore not surprising that, as part of  their 
rhetoric of  social equality, Communist dictatorships preserved men’s and women’s 
suffrage rights where they existed, and even tried to ensure women’s representation 
through the use of  quotas. In some countries, such as Bulgaria,91 Romania,92 and 
Slovenia,93 the Communist regime even introduced equal universal suffrage for the 
first time. Of  course, political rights were in these cases just an empty formality, and 
both the men and women occupying political positions in such regimes were at most 
puppets of  the Communist party.
Fascism saw the role of  the woman differently. Fascist regimes in Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain, all rested on a very traditional view of  women’s social role 
as wives and mothers, but they also tried to portray themselves as connected to the 
needs and distinct contributions of  both men and women within the nation. In par-
ticular, women were involved in civil society through corporatist feminine organiza-
tions, where they were expected to contribute to upholding the moral standards. 
89 See Pateman, supra note 1, at 342, citing craWford Brough macPherSon, the lIfe and tImeS of lIBeral 
democracy 64–9 (1977).
90 zollInger gIele, supra note 50, at 11–12.
91 See Krassimera Dasjkalova, Women’s Suffrage in Bulgaria, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra 
note 2, 321, at 330.
92 Roxana Cheşchebec, The Achievement of  Female Suffrage in Romania, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In 
euroPe, supra note 2, 357, at 368.
93 Irena Selišnik, Female Suffrage in Slovenia, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, supra note 2, 339, 
at 339.
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The family and the home, however, remained their natural place so much so that wom-
en’s employment was at times explicitly banned. The dictators in such regimes thus 
granted men and women some suffrage rights as part of  their populist strategy, but in 
all cases this remained a moot gesture that, in a dictatorship, came at no political cost.
6.2. Synergies and paradigms
Having distilled what seem to have been some of  the main contributing factors, it 
is worth inquiring about possible sets of  conditions signaling and typology of  paths 
that either facilitated or delayed women’s suffrage. Among the countries that granted 
women suffrage before World War II, and often before or right after World War I, 
we can distinguish two groups. First, there are those that followed a “joint track.” 
Here, women’s suffrage was fought for, not as a separate cause, but rather as part of  
the struggle for universal suffrage, understood as including both men and women, 
in search of  a modern notion of  citizenship, sometimes, but not always, linked to a 
campaign for independent statehood. This joint track was followed in some of  the first 
countries granting women full suffrage, including Finland (1906), Denmark (1915), 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (1918), Poland (1918), the Netherlands (1919), 
Luxemburg (1919), and Ireland (1922).94 Political parties seem to have been the main 
protagonists. Since female suffrage was not pitted against male universal suffrage, this 
allowed political parties, including liberals and left-wing parties, to act out of  prin-
ciple on this front (instead of  sacrificing female suffrage on expediency grounds). This 
was so, even though conservative and religious forces seized the opportunity and sup-
ported universal suffrage only in exchange for support on some of  their own causes. 
Also, the absence of  pressure to “prioritize class over gender” sometimes facilitated 
the collaboration between women’s groups and suffragists and political parties, as in 
Finland, where women’s associations were in close collaboration with the Labor Party, 
within which women had a strong and autonomous organization.95
The second group of  countries that granted women suffrage relatively early (and, in 
any event, before World War II) is made up of  those where modernization and demo-
cratization brought about male universal suffrage first, quite often, though not always, 
as a result of  left-wing and progressive forces prioritizing on strategic grounds class 
over gender struggles. In these countries, three factors seem to have been particularly 
conducive to a relatively early access to female suffrage. First was the existence of  
strong women’s and suffragist movements heralding the cause of  women’s franchise 
(as in the UK).96 Second, and in relation to this, was the extent to which the groups 
mobilizing in favor of  women’s suffrage were able to overcome internal divisions over 
94 See, on Finland, Korppi-Tommola, supra note 48, at 48; on Denmark, Fiig & Siim, supra note 68, at 61; 
on Estonia, Biin & Alby, supra note 85, at 111; on Latvia, Branta, supra note 85, at 95; on Lithuania, 
Birmontienė & Jurėnienė, supra note 85, at 79; on Poland, Fuszara, supra note 32, at 143; on the 
Netherlands, Bleijenbergh & Bussemaker, supra note 18, at 179–180; on Luxemburg, Kmec, supra note 
29, at 160–161; and on Ireland, Hill, supra note 32, at 261–264.
95 See Korppi-Tommola, supra note 48, at 49–50.
96 See Cowman, supra note 52, at 274–280, 282–284.
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key issues, including whether to prioritize the worker’s struggle over the women’s 
cause (as in Germany);97 what position to take regarding a nationalist struggle (as in 
Ireland);98 or whether to participate in World War I (as in Germany99 and the UK100). 
Finally, crucial was also the degree of  support that the women’s suffrage movement 
managed to garner from progressive political parties or key male political figures, 
a collaboration that played an essential role in many countries, including Sweden, 
Austria, and Czechoslovakia,101 and/or from conservative sectors joining their cause 
on strategic grounds, as in Spain.102
By contrast, pervasive lack of  political support, or even active resistance of  opposing 
political forces; absence, weakness, or extreme division inside the women’s movement; 
and late access to democracy and independent statehood are primarily responsible for 
the belated achievement of  female suffrage in the rest of  the countries in Europe. When 
the First Republic (1911–1926) was proclaimed in Portugal and the Republican Party 
came to power, it stopped supporting female suffrage for fear of  conservatism attached 
to women’s Catholicism, even though women had articulated much of  their mobiliza-
tion through Republican opposition. As a consequence, female suffrage was delayed 
until 1975 when the dictatorial regime of  the Estado Novo 1926–1974 was finally 
replaced by a modern democratic regime.103 In Italy, a lack of  durable allegiances 
among women’s associations when their primary loyalty was to political parties, and 
a lack of  commitment to the suffrage cause from the main political parties, especially 
the Socialist Party, account for women’s late access to suffrage in 1946.104 Similarly, 
a pervasive lack of  support from the main progressive parties and the absence of  a 
97 In Germany, suffrage was achieved when the divisions between bourgeois and socialist women subsided, 
and socialists’ ambivalence around female suffrage was overcome. See Sacksofsky, supra note 45, at 
134–135.
98 See supra note 322 on Ireland.
99 Sacksofsky, supra note 45, at 134–135.
100 Cowman, supra note 52, at 279–280, 287.
101 In Sweden, women suffragists joined forces with liberals and social democrats against the resistance of  
conservatives (see Wangnerud, supra note 17, at 248). In Austria, success came as a result of  low-profile 
women’s suffragism, which began at the end of  the nineteenth century and was fuelled by international 
suffragism, the overcoming of  class- and ethnicity-based divisions around nationalist struggles, and the 
support of  Social Democrats who supported women’s suffrage only after men had gained universal suf-
frage, and against the resistance of  Christian Socials and German nationalists (see Bader-Zaar, supra note 
21, at 193, 194, 196–198). Also crucial in achieving the vote for women in Czechoslovakia was the alle-
giance between some key male politicians and women’s groups (of  mostly liberal inclination), and, after 
the turn of  the century, specifically suffragist groups, which became particularly active after men gained 
suffrage. See Musilová, supra note 86, at 214–216; and Ľubica Kobová, The Contexts of  National and 
Gender Belonging: The History of  Female Suffrage in Slovakia, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In euroPe, 
225, at 229–230, 234.
102 In Spain, female suffrage was achieved under the Second Republic (1931–1936), through the joining 
of  forces of  the socialists, the conservatives and regionalists which made it possible to overcome the 
Republican opposition by a very small margin. See Aguado, supra note 25, at 293–295.
103 See Maria Lucía Amaral & Teresa Anjinho, Winning Women’s Vote, in the Struggle for female Suffrage In 
euroPe, 475, 479.
104 See Mancini, supra note 19, at 375–378, 382. This resistance became especially acute when the Union of  
Catholic Women formed in 1908 to neutralize the socialist advance (id. at 377).
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suffragist or women’s movement are the main reasons for Belgium’s late granting 
of  female suffrage in 1948.105 An internal split within the women’s movement, late 
suffragism, and a lack of  commitment from mainstream political parties also explain 
why women in Greece only gained suffrage in 1952, and only with the aid of  external 
pressure.106 Similarly, scissions within the women’s movement combined with lack of  
support from the main political parties explain the postponement of  women’s suffrage 
in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, and also Switzerland.107
Finally, in other cases, the late enfranchisement of  women was directly related to 
the fact that independent democratic statehood was itself  late to come. Such a delay 
ensured that male and female universal suffrage would once again come together, and 
without the need for specific political mobilization or support, reflecting a global con-
sensus of  democratic standards. In other words, the later a country consolidated its 
democracy, decolonized, and achieved independent statehood, the higher the chances 
that it would automatically assume universal male and female suffrage to be part of  
the consolidated universal criteria, and the lesser the need for either political parties or 
women’s groups fighting for it locally.108 Both Malta and Cyprus are examples of  late 
female suffrage linked to late decolonization.109
7. Women’s gradual achievement of  citizenship: unsettling 
T.H. Marshall
The evidence provided by the histories behind women’s access to suffrage in Europe 
support the views of  scholars who have identified serious problems with the long-
standing conventions around the modern notion of  citizenship, as a container of  
rights. The theoretical exclusion of  women from political life since the seventeenth 
105 Fearing women’s conservative/religious vote, in an effort to unite anti-Catholic forces, liberals had agreed 
to support the socialist claim for universal male suffrage if  the latter would let go of  women’s suffrage. 
In the end, the example of  neighboring countries (above all the fact that Germany, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands had recognized female suffrage after World War I, and France after World War II), women’s 
contribution to the war, and the strategic action of  the Catholic party created the conditions for the bill 
that the Catholic and Communists submitted to parliament in 1948 that would enfranchise women. See 
Meier, supra note 33, at 411–412.
106 See Samiou, supra note 53, at 442–444.
107 On Bulgaria, see Dasjkalova, supra note 91, at 321–325, 327, 330–331; on Romania, see Cheşchebec, 
supra note 92, at 359 and on Slovenia, see Selišnik, supra note 93, at 339. In Switzerland, a lack of  politi-
cal support and fragmented women’s and suffrage movements seems to have been the cause for the late 
granting of  suffrage rights (see BanaSzak, supra note 27, at 203–208). Additionally, the federal nature of  
the country seems to have worked against it, as the cantons of  Appenzell A.R. and Appenzell I.R. strongly 
opposed state interference (id. at 208–214).
108 It has been noted that only three countries that became independent in the twentieth century (Austria, 
Ireland, and Libya) extended suffrage to men prior to women. The largest worldwide wave of  countries 
extending the franchise to women occurred after 1930, in the wake of  decolonization. After 1945, no 
newly independent country extended suffrage rights to men but not to women. See Ramirez et al., supra 
note 76, at 737–738.
109 On Malta, see Farrugia, supra note 86, at 392, 396. On Cyprus, see Agapiou-Josephides, supra note 80, at 
453, 455–456, 462.
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century, on the basis that women naturally lacked the liberty and independence 
needed for public life, rendered womanhood a disqualification for equal citizenship. By 
the mid-nineteenth century, women’s distinct position had become institutionalized 
through the denial of  civil standing to wives, and the exclusion of  women from the 
public sphere.110 The sexual contract had made women’s work in the fields of  human 
reproduction, care, and management of  dependency within the family indispensable 
for the mise-en-scène of  men’s independence in the public sphere. The nuclear family 
had been constructed as the locus where gender relations are defined and supported, 
and women had been acknowledged to play a role as members of  the community. To 
the extent that this ensured their status as citizens, it implied citizenship of  a different 
kind from men. Instead of  resting on the notion of  independence, women’s citizenship 
revolved around dependency. As such, it constituted the flip-side of  men’s citizenship, 
its opposite, and its enabling instrument at the same time.
This is clear in the connection with the different strands of  citizenship, as articu-
lated by T.H. Marshall.111 In his seminal article “Citizenship and Social Class,” Marshall 
divided citizenship into three parts, “dictated by history even more clearly than by 
logic”:112 civil, political, and social citizenship.113 Marshall’s reading on the unfolding 
of  the concept explained how these three strands of  citizenship were articulated on the 
basis of  civil, political, and social rights, recognized in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and 
twentieth centuries, respectively. Civil rights articulated the independence individuals 
required to interact in the private sphere. As such, their recognition preceded rights 
of  political participation, as only independent individuals could act as independent 
citizens in the public sphere. Social rights then came to guarantee the conditions that 
make possible individuals’ civil independence, and hence their political participation.
Marshall’s analysis has been criticized on several accounts. Feminists, in particular, 
have criticized his failure to reflect how gender (and not only class) divisions structure 
denial of, and access to, citizenship rights.114 Women’s access to citizenship in Europe 
certainly does not fit within the model developed by Marshall. Rather, women’s access 
to citizenship is the inverted image of  that model.
7.1. Women’s civil disenfranchisement
In European countries, the rights that articulate civil citizenship—that is, the rights 
necessary for individual freedom, understood as self-possession, legal personality, and 
market freedoms—were the last to be recognized to women. In fact, with the main 
exception of  the Nordic countries, women gained full suffrage rights before qualify-
ing as independent individuals, through the recognition of  equal rights with men in 
110 Pateman, supra note 1, at 331–348.
111 Thomas Humphrey Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class [1949], in t.h. marShall SocIology at the 
croSSroadS and other eSSayS 73–99 (1963).
112 Id. at 73.
113 Id. at 74.
114 See Walby, supra note 79, at 382, 384. Criticizing Marshall for his ethnocentrism, see also Michael Mann, 
Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship, 21 SocIology 339 (1987); and Bryan S. Turner, Outline of  a Theory 
of  Citizenship, 24(2) SocIology 189 (1990).
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the private sphere—including the capacity of  married women to own property and 
administer their personal belongings, or to live anywhere other than where their 
husbands insisted—and the overcoming of  marital-status related employment dis-
crimination against women. Indeed, until well into the twentieth century, European 
countries articulated women’s relations to other individuals through their subordina-
tion to men. The decisive steps towards truly equal marriage rights were taken after 
1945, and as a rule not before the 1960s and 1970s, marriage and family law being 
regarded as the paradigmatic domains of  traditions.115 Also, the historical significance 
of  married women’s exclusion from rights and duties of  civil law cannot be underesti-
mated, given that, until the extension of  the franchise beyond the propertied classes, it 
was civil rather than political rights that conferred the status of  citizen.116
This is true of  the French, Germanic, and English common law traditions, the only 
significant exception being, as said, that of  the Nordic countries. The French Civil Code, 
Code Napoleon, generally praised as the first realization of  liberal principles in private 
law, fully entailed the preservation of  “the traits of  medieval patriarchy the longest 
and in its purest form.”117 The leading rule, that “The man owes his wife protection; 
the wife owes the husband obedience” (art. 213Cc), meant that, although a wife could 
formally own property, she was under the legal guardianship of  her husband. Forever 
a minor according to the code, she had to request her husband’s authorization for a 
number of  acts, including being a party to legal proceedings, signing contracts, set-
ting herself  up in a profession, doing financial transactions, or joining a political party 
or a trade union. This Code had a great impact on all countries subjected to French 
rule by the Napoleonic wars and left its mark even after those countries or regions 
had gained independence. This was true of  Italy, Spain, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
and some parts of  the German states. In English common law, the so-called coverture 
remained the dominant paradigm. Epitomized by William Blackstone’s dictum in his 
commentary on English common law (“In law husband and wife are one person, and 
the husband is that person”),118 it meant that a married woman could not own prop-
erty or make contracts without her husband’s consent. Free access to both education 
and employment but also equal custodial rights over the children were denied to her. 
Enforced in 1900, with its family and marriage regulation in force until 1953 and 
1957 respectively, the German Civil Code reaffirmed the husband’s right to decide in 
“all matters affecting communal life of  the couple” and also re-established paternal 
authority. Moreover, the husband was in principle granted the exclusive right to man-
age property and to intervene in his wife’s labor contracts. Even in communist dicta-
torships, women’s official equality with men was translated into equal political rights 
115 lISter et al., supra note 9, at 31.
116 Ursula Vogel, Under Permanent Guardianship: Women’s Condition Under Modern Civil Law, in the PolItIcal 
IntereStS of gender 135 (Kathleen B. Jones & Anna G. Jónasdóttir eds., 1988).
117 lISter et al., supra note 9, at 32, citing marIanne WeBer, ehefrau und mutter In der rechtSentWIcklung: eIne 
eInführung (1907).
118 lISter et al., supra note 9, at 32, citing Ursula Vogel, Fiction of  Community: Property Relations in Marriage 
in European and American Legal Systems of  the Nineteenth Century, in PrIvate laW and SocIal InequalIty In the 
InduStrIal age 91 (Willibald Steinmetz ed., 2000).
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(and into social rights and benefits) before full civil equality with men was actually 
spelled out.
Only Scandinavian countries present meaningful exceptions, exceptions which 
must be related to the features of  their transition from agrarian to modern societies, 
and, in particular, the way this transition skipped the bourgeois phase.119 After the 
middle of  the nineteenth century, gender-based guardianship was formally abolished 
for all women, married women’s capacity being connected to a rather early granting 
of  property rights to all women (1874 in Sweden, 1899 in Denmark, and 1888 in 
Norway). Marriage legislation reform also took place several decades sooner than in 
most other European countries (Sweden 1920, Denmark 1925, Norway 1927, and 
Finland 1929),120 providing for equal property rights, divorce liberalization, and com-
plete abolition of  male authority, as well as equal custody of  the children. It is there-
fore interesting to observe that Scandinavian women were among the first to get the 
right to vote.121
7.2. Women’s social disenfranchisement
The different timing of  the achievement of  women’s and men’s citizenship rights also 
applies to social rights. In contrast to the sequence T.H. Marshall theorized using the 
example of  the British male citizen, an opposite order applied to women. Women were 
granted social rights before gaining suffrage rights, and of  course before qualifying as 
independent individuals in the private sphere. In the UK, women were first covered by 
some restrictive and disciplinary social rights under Poor Laws, and then gained some 
social rights as mothers in the early twentieth century.122 A similar sequence can be 
observed in most countries, again with the Nordic exception, where the welfare state 
developed hand in hand with family reform legislation disestablishing the breadwin-
ner model and framing the care of  children as a collective responsibility.
This general sequence explains why the social rights granted to women, preceding 
both political and civil equality, were not aimed at enabling women to act as indepen-
dent individuals. Women’s civil subordination to men was ensured and in fact, those 
social rights that could have worked towards women’s economic independence, such 
as access to education and to the liberal professions, were not among the first to come 
to women. No surprise they became the primary target of  many feminist activists123 
and women’s organizations including the Danish Women’s Society, the Belgian League 
for Women’s Rights, the Finnish Women’s Association, the Latvian Jaunā Strāva, 
the General German Women’s Association, the Hungarian National Association of  
119 lISter et al., supra note 9, at 34.
120 For a historical analysis of  the Nordic welfare state and its connection to the family model, see also the 
nordIc model of marrIage and the Welfare State 27 (Kari Melby, Anu Pylkkänen, Bente Rosenbeck & 
Christina Carlsson-Wetterberg eds., 2000).
121 lISter et al., supra note 9, at 35.
122 Id. at 36.
123 Noteworthy were Teréz Brunszvik, Blanka Teleki, and Hermin Beniczky Pálné Veres in Hungary; Anna 
Karima in Bulgaria; Gabrielė Petkevičaitė-Bitė in Lithuania; and Sappho Leontias, Polyxeni Loizias, and 
Persophone Papadopoulou in Cyprus.
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Female Clerical Workers, the Polish Enthusiasts, the Slovak Živena (Donatrix of  Life), 
the Czech Women’s Clubs, and the Bulgarian Women’s Union. Their efforts in this 
regard were sometimes countered by a conservative approach to women’s education 
geared towards forming good mothers and wives.
With some rare exceptions, women were first and foremost granted social rights 
that did not aim at educating them, but at improving their living and working con-
ditions as women and mothers. In a liberal context, these rights were therefore 
double-edged, having an impact on the establishment of  a gender order in the emerg-
ing welfare state by reconfirming a gender-specific division of  labor reflected in a “two 
channel welfare state”124 or the patriarchal welfare state.125 Indeed, as Orloff  recalls, 
the programs of  social provision established across the West in what can be called the 
“formative period of  the welfare state”—from approximately the 1880s to the onset of  
World War I—were designed to reflect the breadwinner, and the family wage system, 
which viewed women as primary caretakers, domestic workers, and, at best, second-
ary wage earners.126 So, just as the independent male householder/property owner 
had been the “ideal-typical citizen” in classical liberal and democratic theory, the 
“male-family provider, working-class hero” served as the “ideal typical citizen” in the 
literature on social rights.127 This then often translated into a “two-tier” system (social 
insurance/social assistance).128 The end result of  the latter was to incorporate women 
in the welfare state indirectly, primarily on the basis of  their husband’s contribution 
rather than on their own or as independent right bearers.129
In sum, women’s social rights protected women and singled them out as unable to 
protect themselves at the same time. They improved women’s social conditions while 
emphasizing their natural vulnerability, making women the recipients of  public help 
and the likely objects of  higher levels of  public control. In the public sphere, similar to 
the private sphere, women were thus subjected to what has been called the “care/control 
paradigm”,130 which resulted “in the infantilization of  women in citizenship terms.”131 
124 Barbara J. Nelson, The Origins of  the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen’s Compensation and Mother’s Aid, 
in Women, the State and Welfare 123 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990). The split that accounts for such a model 
is that between labor-market-related social-security programs targeting male recipients and family-based 
means-tested social-assistance schemes with primarily female recipients. lISter et al., supra note 9, at 37.
125 See Ann Shola Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights of  Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of  Gender Relations 
and Welfare States, 58 am. Soc. rev. 303 (1993); elIzaBeth WIlSon, Women and the Welfare State (1977); mImI 
aBramovItz, regulatIng the lIveS of Women: SocIal Welfare PolIcy from colonIal tImeS to the PreSent (1988).
126 See Orloff, supra note 125, at 323.
127 Id. at 308, citing Walter Korpi, Power, Politics, and State Autonomy in the Development of  Social Citizenship: 
Social Rights during Sickness in eighteen OECD Countries since 1930, 54 am. Soc. rev. 309 (1989) 309–
28; and gøSta eSPIng-anderSen, the three WorldS of Welfare caPItalISm (1990); and thomaS humPhrey 
marShall, cItIzenShIP and SocIal claSS and other eSSayS (1950).
128 Whereas social assistance programs were designed to serve a predominantly female clientele (such as welfare 
or aid to family with dependent children, which are politically less legitimate, less well funded, and more 
oriented towards monitoring clients’ behavior and income), contributory social insurance targeted a pre-
dominantly male clientele (such as unemployment and retirement benefits). Orloff, supra note 125, at 315.
129 Id.
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That is, women were conceptualized as recipients of  protection more than as empow-
ered citizens, or as “passive” citizens. The irony, of  course, was that in many countries 
women’s social citizenship came then to be seen as epitomizing women’s dependence, 
and subsequently used as an argument to resist female suffrage, since independence had 
always been the central criterion associated with citizenship and men.
8. From the franchise to parity democracy: a change of  
paradigm? 
In no single country did access to suffrage translate into women gaining equal 
political representation with men. If  we take the countries forming the European 
Union, even nowadays women’s representation in the lower house of  their national 
parliament is higher than 40 percent only in two of  them: Sweden (45 percent) 
and Finland (43 percent). In several other countries (including Cyprus (11 per-
cent), Hungary (9 percent), Ireland (15 percent), Romania (13 percent), and 
Malta (9 percent)), women’s representation remains close to or below 15 percent. 
Countries in which women’s representation is around 20 percent include Slovakia 
(19 percent), Bulgaria (23 percent), the Czech Republic (22 percent), Estonia (21 
percent), Poland (24 percent), Greece (21 percent), Latvia (23 percent), Lithuania 
(25 percent), Italy (21 percent), Luxemburg (22 percent), and the UK (23 percent), 
whereas in France (27 percent), Austria (28 percent), Switzerland (29 percent), 
Germany (33 percent), Slovenia (32 percent), and Portugal (29 percent), the repre-
sentation is around 30 percent. Closer to 40 percent representation come only the 
Netherlands (39 percent), Belgium (38 percent), Denmark (39 percent), and Spain 
(36 percent).132
It is interesting to notice that many of  the countries with a higher number of  
women representatives today are among those where women gained suffrage at an 
earlier stage, including Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark. This correla-
tion does not always stand, however. While Belgium only recognized female suffrage 
after World War II, today it has a comparatively high number of  female representa-
tives. In Luxembourg and the UK, on the other hand, women representatives stand at 
around 20 percent, despite both being among the pioneers in enfranchising women. 
Among the many variables which explain such variations are, just to mention a few, 
the electoral system (proportional systems are known to favor the representation of  
women over majority-based systems); the size of  electoral districts (larger districts are 
known to be more favorable to women’s representation); and whether or not gender 
quotas have been adopted, either internally by all or some political parties or legisla-
tively imposed.
A striking, and consistent, pattern is that in no European country women have 
achieved parity, understood as a representation that comes close to 50 percent. In 
most of  them, maybe with the exception of  some of  those who were real latecomers, it 
132 This data, pertaining to 2012, comes from the Interparliamentary Union’s webpage, http://www.ipu.
org/wmn-e/classif.htm.
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took women several decades after they gained suffrage for women to become political 
representatives in numbers that could be described as more than token or symbolic. 
Thus, it took approximately sixty years after women’s enfranchisement for Denmark 
and Sweden to cross the 20 percent threshold of  women in parliamentary seats, and 
seventy years to reach the 30 percent mark.133 And in Finland, the country that came 
first in our sample, granting women suffrage as early as in 1906, until the 1970s 
women’s representation remained under 22 percent, increasing in the period from 
1970 to 1990 to 31 percent, and surpassing the 30 percent threshold only in 2007 to 
reach 41 percent today.
Thus, although universal suffrage was envisaged as the means to transit to a demo-
cratic state encompassing both men and women, female suffrage failed to question 
the sexual contract as a foundational myth of  the state, and this remained, as a result, 
markedly masculine.134 The effects of  women’s political rights were mitigated by wom-
en’s belated civil citizenship and the gender bias of  women’s social citizenship,135 all 
of  which was supported by the cultural and economic reinforcement of  the nuclear 
family and breadwinner model in the post-World War II years.136 This reinforced the 
public realm as the territory of  men and the private sphere as the domain of  women, 
and consecrated the endemic majority participation of  men in public affairs, employ-
ment, and politics, in a public arena built upon the foundations of  the ideal of  male 
independence.137
In fact, one of  the most fascinating stories in the history of  women’s citizenship 
in Europe is how the transition from former communist regimes to democratic lib-
eralism was accompanied by an initial phase of  “allergy to feminism,” a rejection 
of  a gender-neutral, homogenizing conception of  equality and citizenship, and the 
assertion of  the role of  the “occupational housewife,” which had not existed during 
Communism.138 Transition to modern democracy was interpreted as validating the 
separate spheres tradition, arriving hand in hand with a decrease in the proportion 
of  women in the public arena in many countries of  the former Soviet bloc, including 
Hungary,139 Estonia,140 Poland,141 Slovakia,142 and Romania.143 Only now, in connec-
tion to EU accession, with the consequent introduction of  a European gender anti-
discrimination framework and equal opportunities policies, is the notion of  gender 
equality experiencing a re-legitimization.
133 See Women, quotaS and PolItIcS (Drude Dahlerup ed., 2006).
134 See Blanca Rodríguez-Ruiz & Ruth Rubio-Marín, The Gender of  Representation: On Democracy, Equality and 
Parity, 6(2) Int’l J. conSt. l. 287, 306 (2008).
135 Id. at 309.
136 For a critique of  this family model, see Nancy Fraser, After the Family Wage, in nancy fraSer, JuStIce 
InterruPtS: crItIcal reflectIonS on the PoSt-SocIalISt condItIon 41 (1996).
137 Rodriguez-Ruiz & Rubio-Marín, supra note 134, at 309.
138 Biin & Alby, supra note 85, at 123; Kovacs, cited in Ann Snitow, Cautionary Tales, in Women and cItIzenShIP 
In central and eaStern euroPe 287 (Jasmina Lukić, Joanna Regulska, and Darja Zaviršek eds., 2006) 288.
139 See Kollonay-Lehoczky, supra note 20, at 436.
140 See Biin & Alby, supra note 85, at 122.
141 See Fuszara, supra note 32, at 156–157.
142 See Kobová, supra note 101, at 237.
143 See Cheşchebec, supra note 92, at 370–371.
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Of  course, much has changed since women first achieved suffrage and since the 
post-World War II years celebrating “the angel in the home” model. In most European 
countries today, many more women take an active role in politics and the labor mar-
ket than in the immediate aftermath of  enfranchisement. In every country, legisla-
tive reform has been undertaken to gradually ensure women’s equal citizenship. Yet, 
when explaining the gender gap in political representation, and, more generally, the 
ways in which equal franchise has not delivered equal citizenship, one must take into 
account the persistence of  facts such as the unequal distribution of  domestic work 
and unpaid care labor; the gender pay gap; women’s segregation and precariousness 
in the employment market (where they have a greater share of  the less-qualified and 
often part-time positions); lack of  child-care and insufficient parental leave; gender 
bias in social security schemes still entrenching the breadwinner model; and the lack 
of  leadership positions in the private sector, media, and academia, including in busi-
ness managerial positions. All of  these are signs of  the legacy of  a sexual contract 
which has not yet been sufficiently disestablished, a legacy revealing that the pub-
lic sphere continues to be male dominated, and that, to the extent that women have 
entered the public domain, this has not been accompanied by a parallel shift of  men 
to the private sphere.144
In view of  all this, we can only celebrate that, at least since the mid-1980s, there has 
been an active agenda of  European dimension to expand the idea of  equality between 
men and women, to finish the task of  ensuring women’s full citizenship by removing 
the remnants of  the sexual contract. Whereas European policies were initially lim-
ited to non-discrimination and equal opportunities in the employment domain, there 
has been a gradual expansion of  what equality between men and women means. 
Gender equality has started to be regarded as a democratic necessity that encompasses 
women’s empowerment in both the public and private domestic domains.145 The 
Council Recommendation on the balanced participation of  women and men in deci-
sion-making, adopted following the Council’s resolution of  March 1996, started to 
epitomize a view which has since only gained more of  a foothold.146
This evolution at the level of  the European Union has followed a concern with the 
balanced participation of  women and men in political and public decision-making, 
expressed since the mid-1980s by the Council of  Europe. In 1997 the Declaration 
on Equality between women and men as a fundamental criterion of  democracy was 
adopted during the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Equality between Women 
and Men, in Istanbul, becoming a reference for all those working to increase the par-
ticipation of  women in decision-making. The Declaration argues that “the marginal-
ization of  women in public life and democracy [is] a structural factor . . . linked to the 
unequal distribution of  economic and political power between women and men and 
144 See fIona mackay, love and PolItIcS: Women PolItIcIanS and the ethIcS of care 83 (2001).
145 See Agnès Hubert, From Equal Pay to Parity Democracy: The Rocky Ride of  Women’s Policy in the European 
Union, in haS lIBeralISm faIled Women?, supra note 14, 143, at 148. Rubio Marin, supra note 3, at 
104–107.
146 See A Strengthened Commitment to Equality between Women and Men. A Women’s Charter, Communication 
from the Commission (Mar. 5, 2010), Doc. no. COM(2010)78 final.
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to attitudinal stereotypes regarding the social roles of  women and men,” preventing 
both from realizing their potential. In view of  this, equality required a “dynamic chal-
lenge to the established power structures and to stereotyped sex roles so as to achieve 
structural change” and a “new social order.” Part of  this change required “greater 
participation by men in the sphere of  private life, in caring responsibilities,” and a 
“more equal sharing of  responsibilities for decision-making in political and profes-
sional life with women,” something which would arguably “improve the quality of  
life for all.”
At a national level, there have also been signs of  progress. Over the last two decades, 
the idea of  relying on some form of  quota to ensure women’s access to political office 
has increasingly been accepted in several European countries. In France, Belgium, 
Slovenia, Spain, and Portugal, the law imposes some form of  gender quota in elect-
ing representatives for political office.147 In many other countries, such as Norway, 
Sweden, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom, some of  the political parties have 
adopted gender quotas for electoral candidates voluntarily.
 More recently, there has also been a growing awareness that parity democracy can 
only be affirmed if  women are incorporated not only into politics, but also into all the 
other spheres of  public and private power, something which must therefore include 
the world of  the corporate elite. Many European countries, such as Finland, Sweden, 
Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland, are approaching the problem 
of  women’s under-representation in corporate boards of  public limited companies 
through soft measures, including corporate governance codes and charters that com-
panies can sign voluntarily.148 But increasingly, gender quotas set by legislation are 
being considered as well. In 2003, Norway became the first country in the world to 
pass a law requiring all public companies to achieve gender balance on corporate 
boards (at least 40 percent of  each sex),149 a measure it extended in 2006 to public lim-
ited companies. In Spain, in 2007, a law introducing gender parity for electoral office 
also enshrined the goal of  gender parity on corporate boards as a goal to be achieved 
by 2015. In Iceland, legislation adopted in 2010 applicable to publicly owned and 
publicly limited companies with more than 50 employees aims to ensure that each sex 
will make up at least 40 percent of  boards by 2013. Even more recently, in 2011, simi-
lar quota legislation for state and public companies has also been approved in France, 
Belgium, and Italy.150
The unequal distribution of  public and private power between women and men has 
thus become a key issue in European democracies, resulting in new approaches to 
147 See European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Electoral Gender 
Quota Systems and Their Implementation in Europe (2008), at 11.
148 See Julie C.  Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Corporate Boards, 10(2) Int’l 
J. conSt. l. 449, 449 (2012); Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 Berkeley 
BuS. l. J. 55 (2009).
149 Countries setting gender quotas for state-owned companies also include Denmark, Finland, and Iceland 
from early 2000.
150 For a summary, see Publications Office of  the European Union, Report on Progress on Equality between 
Women and Men in 2010. The Gender Balance in Business Leadership (2011).
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advance gender equity and to re-conceptualize citizenship rights. Reflecting on the 
forces that led to female suffrage now seems relevant at a time when the construction 
of  a European citizenship stands as an open political project. This project inevitably 
draws on existing notions of  citizenship, but at the same time has an enormous poten-
tial to redefine these very notions. Exploring the role that female suffrage has played in 
the construction of  female citizenship, and of  the place female suffrage and citizenship 
occupy in working notions of  citizenship, is important at this junction.
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